the agreement on trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights (Annex 1C of the World Trade Organization agreement of 15 April 1994); See secretariat of the Agreement, the results of the multilateral trade negotiations of the Uruguay Round, texts 365 and following (1994), www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/legal_e.htm#wtoagreement (delivered on 25 November 2003). The WTO regularly organizes symposia, training and other events on intellectual property, trade and other related topics in collaboration with other international organizations. For more details on the events, click here. This pressure, which can be bilateral (for example. B under U.S. Trade Representative Special Procedure 301) or multilateral (smaller competing trade agreements such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), has multiplied in recent years due to an effective failure of the WTO negotiations, which halted further progress in their last round of negotiations, the Doha Development Round. According to trips, the industrialized countries should have fully implemented the agreement by 1 January 1996. Members of developing countries and members in transition to a market economy were allowed to delay the full implementation of TRIPS commitments until 1 January 2000. The least developed members had until January 1, 2006 to meet their obligations, with the possibility of a new transition on demand.
Developing countries, which, at the time of filing, did not grant patent protection for certain technology sectors, were given a new five-year period, until 1 January 2005, to guarantee such protection. In November 2005, the 2006 transition period for least developed countries was extended until 1 July 2013. TRIPS require Member States to firmly protect intellectual property rights. For example, under TRIPS: Daniele Archibugi and Andrea Filippetti argue that the importance of TRIPS in the process of developing and disseminating knowledge and innovation has been overestimated by its supporters. This was supported by the FINDINGs of the United Nations that many low-protection countries regularly benefit from significant foreign direct investment (FDI).  Analysis of OECD countries in the 1980s and 1990s (which extended the lifespan of drug patents by 6 years) showed that, although the total number of registered products increased slightly, the average innovation index remained unchanged.  On the other hand, J-rg Baten, Nicola Bianchi and Petra Moser (2017) find historical evidence that compulsory licensing – a key mechanism for weakening IP rights under Article 31 of TRIPS – can effectively lead to the promotion of inventions by increasing the threat to competition in areas of low competition.